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THE EFFECT OF INTERGOVERNMENTAL AID ON CITY
PROPERTY TAXES: NEW RESULTS FOR MINNESOTA
John R. Bartle

ABSTRACT. An earlier study found that certain Minnesota state aid programs
stimulated city property tax levies to a high degree. If this is accurate, it
suggests potentially serious problems with state property tax relief efforts. This
article re-examines this question and finds that most aid programs have little
direct effect on property tax levies. However, certain aid formulas that reduce
the effective price of property taxes do indirectly stimulate property taxes.
Therefore, states need to be careful in designing aid programs intended to
reduce property taxes.

INTRODUCTION
In presenting results on the different effects of Minnesota state aid
programs, Bell and Bowman (1987) found that a state homeowner
property tax credit had a stimulative effect on city property tax levies
while state lump-sum aid to cities had a positive but insignificant effect
on tax levies. They argued that this result was due in part to the
substitution and income effects of the former program in contrast to the
income effect of the latter. The irony of these findings is that both
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programs have property tax relief as their goal, but instead apparently
stimulate higher property taxes. Bell and Bowman (1987: 293) wrote,
"These findings are consistent with the notion that a bloating of the
public sector results from divorcing the pain of taxation from the
pleasure of spending."
Their findings are important for policy design. If policies designed
to reduce local property taxes have the perverse effect of increasing
them, then this suggests a serious need for reform. More generally,
findings that aid programs have varying fiscal impacts may suggest ways
that policymakers can fine-tune the grants-in-aid system to get the results
they seek.
This paper re-examines Bell and Bowman's results for Minnesota
and extends and corrects their work. Then a simultaneous equation
model is presented to allow more detailed examination of city tiscal
response to aid. This paper proceeds as follows: first the aid programs
are described, followed by a literature review. Then the relevant
variables are operationalized, the econometric issues are discussed and
Bell and Bowman's model is re-estimated. Then a comprehensive model
of city budgets is estimated, followed by a conclusion.

DESCRIPTION OF THE AID PROGRAMS
Several aid programs are examined here. Minnesota's local government aid program (LGA) is a form of lump-sum aid that attempts to
substitute state resources for local property taxes, and to distribute funds
to counter disparities in local tax effort and tax capacity (Bell, 1986). In
fiscal year 1987, cities received $296 million from this program, about
$69 per capita (Carlson, 1988). Until 1988, the homestead credit
directly reduced homeowners' property tax bills by 54% up to a $700
maximum. The state reimbursed local taxing authorities for the tax
relief. This aid is effectively a form of matching aid for the entire
budget of local governments. The program cost the state $582 million
in fiscal year 1987, or $137 per capita. Cities received $116 million of
the total (Carlson, 1988; Minnesota Department of Revenue, 1987). In
1988 the Minnesota Legislature changed the homestead credit design,
rolling the credit into the state property tax classification system. As a
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result, the credit is now part of a more generous calculation of the
taxable valuation of homes, and so no longer has the matching aid effect.
Minnesota's property tax refund, or "circuit breaker" program is
paid to both homeowners and renters based on their household income
and property tax paid. The program acts as a refund where the state
sends the claimant a check for property taxes already paid. In fiscal year
1987 total payments wen:l $156 million or $37 per capita (Minnesota
Department of Revenue, 1987).
Minnesota state highway aid is distributed to municipalities based
on population and need, as determined by the Minnesota Department of
Transportation. Other state and local aid to cities fund police, fire,
airports, community development, health, project grants, and aid to cities
in taconite mining areas.
Federal aid is composed of many different aid programs. Two of
the largest during this perilod for these cities are general revenue sharing
(GRS) and community development block grants (CDBG). Other federal
aid includes grants for sewage, airports, health and project grants.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Bell and Bowman (1987) examined the effect of aid on local
property tax levies. They found that total federal aid was significant,
ranging from .11 to .16 in three specifications. State LGA was positive
but not significant and the homestead credit was significant, ranging from
1.14 to 1.33.
There are relatively t~~w articles focusing on state intergovernmental
aid other than Bell and Bowman's. Most examine the effect of aid on
spending rather than taxes. Ladd and Yinger (1989) looked at the
spending effect of total state aid on several U.S. cities and reported a
significant .32 effect on current city spending. Simonsen (1994) found
that a state aid variable consisting largely of highway aid had no effect
on either capital or current spending for Oregon cities.
A few studies have looked at the effect of state aid on the revenue
side. Stine (1994) found that increases in total state aid (mostly matching
categorical aid) had no significant effect on either own-source revenues
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or property taxes for Pennsylvania counties. However the aid response
was asymmetric; aid increases had no effect but aid decreases were
associated with an increase of .19 in local own-source revenue and .09
in property taxes. Examining a pooled data set of 39 U.S. cities over 17
years, Bartle (1995) found that state general purpose aid reduced city
property taxes by .43 per dollar of aid and increased capital spending by
.18. Categorical state aid caused a small (. 07) increase in city nonproperty taxes and increased both current (. 72) and capital (.12) spending
for a total spending increase of .84.
With the exception of the Bell and Bowman article, the effect of aid
on revenues ranged from .07 to -.43 and the effects of aid on spending
ranged from zero to .84.. The positive effect of aid on property taxes
that Bell and Bowman found differs from most other findings. In
particular, the coefficients for the homeowner credit are very high.

OPERATIONALIZING THE MODEL
Following Bell and Bowman, the dependent variable for the first
two models is city net property tax levy per capita (NPTLPC), which is
the city tax levy net of the homestead credit amount received by the city.
The third model is a simultaneous equation model with five different
dependent variables.
Drawing from Inman (1979), a median voter model is derived
demonstrating the effect of each of these aid programs on both the full
fiscal income and the tax price of the median voter. (1) These two
variables in turn affect the demand for public goods and hence the tax
levy. Other variables influencing city tax levy are: the preferences of the
median voter, before-tax income, and resident share of the property tax
base.
Aid Variables
In this model, aid programs affect net city levy either through the
tax price of the median voter or her full fiscal income. The matching or
refund percentages of the homestead credit, circuit breaker and other
matching aid affect tax price, while the dollar amount of these and other
aid programs affect full fiscal income.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

154

BARTLE

Lump sum aid affects only the income of the median voter. It is
represented here by two programs, the per capita amount received from
Minnesota's LGA program (LGAPC) and the per capita amount of state
highway aid received (HYRPC). The state highway aid formula is based
on demographic and other variables and so is essentially a type of lump
sum aid. The predicted effect of lump sum aid on both public and
private goods is positive. Public goods can be increased by increasing
city spending while an increase in spending on private goods requires a
tax reduction. Where net property tax levy is the dependent variable, the
expected coefficients for lump sum aid programs is negative. It is
possible that they might be zero, which implies that all of the aid funds
the other portions of the budget: spending and non-property tax relief.
It is not expected that the coefficients would be positive. This would
imply that the full amount of the aid plus the added amount indicated by
the positive coefficient is funding spending and non-property tax relief.
The effect of the homestead credit on the median voter's income is
captured by the variable CREDPC, per capita homestead credit payments
to the city. Like lump sum aid, it is expected to have a negative effect
on the net city tax levy because city taxes must be reduced for this aid
to fund private spending. The effect of the credit on tax price is
discussed below. Circuit breaker payments net out the homestead credit
received by homeowners. The variable CBNETPC is the per capita
amount of these payments to city residents. The anticipated effect of the
circuit breaker is different from that of other aid programs. Since this
refund is paid directly to individuals rather than to the city, it should
have a positive effect on taxes of between zero and one and a similar
impact on spending.
Per capita amounts of other aid programs are represented by two
variables: federal aid (F AID PC) and other state and local aid
(OTHRPC), each representing several aid programs which are both
matching and non-matching in nature. While the matching aid programs
affect tax price, data on the collective effect of their matching rates are
not available and so are not included in the tax price variable. Instead
these variables represent both the income and price effect of the aid.
Thus, their effect on city tax levies should be higher than that of lump
sum aid. Where the matching aid rates are high, these coefficients may
be zero or positive.
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Tax price is affected by the homestead credit percentage and the
circuit breaker refund percentage. The tax price variable is constructed
as follows:
PRICE = 1 -[(.54* PHBMC)+(CBNET/CBQTAX)]
where 0.54 is the portion of the property tax bill paid by the state (up
to the maximum),
PHBMC is the percentage of homes below the maximum credit,
CBNET is the net amount of circuit breaker payment to city
residents and CBQTAX is total qualifying property tax payments
(including rent).<2l
PRICE measures the combined effective subsidy rate for both aid
programs, inclusive of both renters and homeowners. It uses the
citywide average tax price as the price facing the median voter, although
any particular person in the city may face a different tax price. It is
hypothesized that PRICE will have a negative influence on net property
tax leviesYl

Other Variables
Following Bell and Bowman (1987), and Bradbury, Ladd, Perrault,
Reschovsky and Yinger (1984), the preferences of the median voter are
operationalized using several variables to represent the demand or
preferences of the median voter. POLD is the percentage of the city
population over 65 years of age and PYOUNG is the percentage under
18. PPOOR is the percentage under the poverty level and POWNOC is
the percentage of occupied housing units that are owner occupied. <4l It
is expected that cities with high proportions of population groups
benefiting disproportionately from municipal services, such as children,
may have greater demands on local spending and taxes, while cities with
populations benefiting less, such as the elderly, would demand lower
taxes and services. Thus PYOUNG should have a positive effect on
spending and taxes while POLD should be negative. Homeowners feel
the property tax more directly than do renters, so POWNOC should have
a negative influence on property taxes. The influence of the poor on city
taxes and spending is unclear due to two conflicting considerations. On
the one hand they probably need a higher level of services, but on the
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other they may be less able to pay for these services. Thus the sign for
this variable is ambiguous.
Before-tax income ils represented by per capita income (PCINC),
which should have a positive effect on the tax levy. The influence of the
resident's share of the property tax base is captured in the variable
OMEQPC. This variable measures the per capita amount of property
taxes that would be raised by one mill, and is expected to have a positive
coefficient. No variable is included for the cost of local public goods
here; it is assumed to b1~ constant across these cities during this time
period.
The effect of tax exporting is included here, following Bell and
Bowman. They hypothesized that cities with higher percentages of
taxable property value in commercial and industrial property would be
able to "export" part of the property taxes on this property, thus creating
a positive influence on city property taxes. The same question is
analyzed here using the variable COMBAS, a measure of the
composition of the property tax base. <5J
ECONOMETRIC ISSUES
Bell and Bowman (1987) presented three different specifications for
1983. The aid effects have been noted above. In addition, they found
that property tax capacity was positive and significant in each case. The
property tax base composition variable gave mixed evidence of tax
exporting. The influence of their tax price variable was negative as
expected. The results for the demographic variables found PYOUNG to
be positive and generally significant, POLD to be jnsignificant,
POWNOC to be negative and significant, and PPOOR to be positive and
significant. These influences are generally consistent with the expected
signs.
Gramlich (1970) has warned of two econometric problems in
research on intergovernmental grants. First is the choice between crosssection and time-series data sets. In cross-section studies the structure
may not be constant across the units of observation and also the study
may be unduly influenced by the choice of the time period. Gramlich
(1970: 579) suggests, "[a] good way to circumvent the latter problems
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is to estimate pooled, cross-section regressions." Second, he points out
the potential for simultaneous equation bias. "It is certainly true that
grants affect state and local expenditures, but it may also be true that
expenditures affect grants" (Gramlich, 1970: 581). He suggests using
either instrumental variables or simultaneous equation systems to address
this problem. He points out that both of these problems are likely to
lead to overestimates of the effect of grants.
The Bell and Bowman (1987) study is open to both of these challenges. First, it is a cross-section study for 1983 only. Second, some
of the aid programs examined are, by design, related to city tax levies.
In particular, it has been suggested that because the formula for the
distribution of LGA and the homestead credit is based in part on city tax
levies, any correlation between levies and aid is a result of these
formulas rather than behavioral responses to the programs.<6l This may
also be true for the circuit breaker variable because local governments
and taxpayers may take the refund into account when making their
decisions about local taxes. Further, the circuit breaker, state highway
aid and other state aid were omitted from the Bell and Bowman study.
The excluded variables should be included to eliminate the possibility of
specification bias. Therefore in re-estimating Bell and Bowman's
equation, careful examination of the problems of the stability of the
cross-section estimates, simultaneity and specification bias need to be
done.
The data source used here is the same, the cities included are almost
identical and the time period of this study is 1984 to 1988 while Bell and
Bowman used 1983. Because of the time element introduced, all fiscal
variables are in real do!iars per capita. <7J
The equations were initially estimated in separate cross-sections, but
because the parameter estimates were relatively stable, it was appropriate
to pool the data. This yielded substantially higher F-values and lower
standard errors. In a pooled model, one option is to add dummy
variables for time and space, transforming the model into a fixed effects
model. Some testing of these models was done, but in the end a model
without any dummy variables was chosen. The dummy variables for the
years were not significant. When dummy variables were added for the
cities, the adjusted R-squared rose from .602 to .957 indicating that a

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

BARTLE

158

substantial improvement in explanatory power was possible. However,
this model changed the signs of PYOUNG and PRICE in unanticipated
directions and rendered several of the other variables insignificant.
Therefore, the more parsimonious yet powerful model without dummy
variables was accepted.
To address the problem of simultaneity, instrumental variables were
created for CREDPC, LGAPC and CBNETPC using exogenous
variables. The instrument for the credit variable (CREDIVPC) was
constructed with total residential market value and the percentage of the
homes below the maximum credit. The instrumental variable for LGA
(LGAIVPC) was created with three exogenous variables related to the aid
formula: total city taxable value, population and population squared. The
circuit breaker instrumental variable (CBIVPC) was constructed with two
variables that are part of the aid formula: the number of filers and the
qualifying property tax amounts for the refund.
RESULTS

Table 1 presents two sets of results. Model 1 is a pooled model
very similar to Bell and Bowman's model. It shows a positive and
significant effect of OMEQPC as expected. For the aid variables,
FAIDPC is not significant, while both LGAPC and CREDPC are
positive and significant. CREDPC is especially high, at 1.277. Both
coefficients are quite close to those estimated by Bell and Bowman,
although LGA was not significant and F AID PC was significant in their
research. The coefficient for PRICE is negative and significant as
predicted. For the demographic variables, POWNOC takes the expected
negative sign, indicating the relative reluctance of homeowners to choose
higher property taxes. PYOUNG is positive and significant as expected,
while POLD is insignificant. PPOOR, whose predicted sign was
ambiguous, is positive and significant. Finally, COMBAS, the tax
exporting variable, is positive and significant as predicted.
In another regression, the instrumental variables for LGA and the
credit were introduced with no other changes. The homestead credit
coefficient changed from 1.277 to -.161, significant in both cases, while
the LGA coefficient changed in value from .174 to -.345, again
significant in both cases. These changes in sign reverse the earlier
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TABLE 1
Two Models Explaining Net Property Tax Levy Per Capita
Expected Sign

Model 1

Model 2

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Intercept
OMEQPC
FAIDPC

+
01+

LG APC/LGAIVPC
CREDPC/CREDIVPC
CBIVPC

-52.245*
(19. 750)
15 .703*
(.477)
.012
(.012)
. 174*
(.053)
1.277*
(.116)

+

HYRPC
OTHRPC

01+

PRICE
PCINC

-41.020*
(7.822)

+

POWNOC
PYOUNG

+

POLD
PPOOR
COMBAS
N
R-squared
Adjusted R-squared
F

?

+

-.764*
(.167)
2.220*
(.323)
-.074
(.255)
2.676*
(.386)
.603*
(.144)
880
.6061
.6016
133.886

-8 .880
(40.022)
19.262*
(1.843)
.055
(.045)
.055
(. 157)
-.234
(.227)
.374*
(.185)
-.020
(. 100)
.130
(. 124)
-71.721 *
(24 .795)
-4.326*
(1.427)
-.080
(.384)
1.377*
(.671)
.946
(.489)
1.931 *
(.771)
.174
(.280)
311
.5143
.4914
22.46

Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors; and
* Indicates significant at the .95 confidence level.
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conclusion by Bell and Bowman. They indicate that the effect of both
aid programs work as hypothesized here, reducing rather than increasing
local tax levies. The tax price variable stayed negative and significant
and F AID PC was still insignificant.
Several other variables are included in Model 2. Because the data
available on the circuit breaker are limited to 104 cities from 1984 to
1986, the number of observations drops substantially. <Sl The capacity
variable, OMEQPC stays positive and significant. F AID PC is still not
significant. LGAIVPC and CREDIVPC lose their significance, suggesting that their effect on property taxes may be zero rather than negative.
CBIVPC is positive and significant as expected, indicating that about a
third of this aid finds its way from refund recipients' pockets into higher
property taxes. Neither HYRPC nor OTHRPC is significant. PRICE
continues to be negative and significant. PCINC takes on an unexpected
negative sign. POWNOC loses its significance but keeps its expected
negative sign. The sign and significance of PYOUNG and PPOOR are
unchanged and POLO changes sign but stays insignificant. COMBAS
becomes insignificant.
The results for the aid coefficients are more consistent with what
theory predicts. A negative impact of aid on net levies indicates that
some part of the aid goes into the private sector. High positive and
significant coefficients suggest that all of the aid plus additional local
sources of revenue are captured by the city. Over the long run this
cannot be explained by the standard model of grants. This suggests that
Bell and Bowman's results for the homestead credit and LGA were overstated because of the simultaneity with the dependent variable, leading
to erroneous conclusions about the effect of these aid programs on local
property tax levies.

A MODEL OF CITY BUDGETS
Moving beyond the Bell and Bowman study, the full budgetary
impact of the aid programs is examined to tell a more complete story
about the effect of aid on city budgets. Until now, the on! y dependent
variable has been property tax levies, so we have been unable to tell how
aid affects other parts of city budgets.
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This approach runs six related regressions. The dependent variables
are: total current spending (TCEPC), total capital spending (TKEPC),
"other spending" (OTHEXPC -- composed of fund transfers, debt
service, debt redemption, and the difference between total revenues and
total expenditures), property tax revenues (PTAXPC), borrowing and
transfers (BORTRNPC), and other revenues less intergovernmental
revenues (OTHREVPC ··- composed of local sales and lodging taxes,
special assessments, tax increment revenues, fines, licenses, permits,
fees, charges and interest).
Because of the relationship between the dependent variables, more
efficient estimates are possible if a system of six equations are estimated
(Pindyck & Rubinfeld, 1981). The seemingly unrelated regression model
(SUR) used takes into account the correlation of the error terms that
arises because of the relationship among the dependent variables.
The construction of these dependent variables account for all city
funds other than aid revenues. By construction, the net impact on these
budget categories should equal the total for each aid program. Thus the
sum of the aid coefficients across all six equations should equal one. A
test of the hypothesis that the sum of the coefficients is one was
performed. For the circuit breaker the examination is not appropriate
because the funds are paid to individuals rather than to governments.
These tests of the hypothesis were not rejected for LGA, federal aid,
highway aid and other state aid, but was rejected for the homestead
credit.
Three features of this model should be noted. First, the property
tax variable used here (PT AXPC) is different from the per capita tax
levy because of the timing of property tax payments and because of the
unique property tax base sharing law affecting cities in the MinneapolisSaint Paul metropolitan area. PT AXPC is used here because it better fits
in the budgetary model. Second, the instrumental variables LGAIVPC,
CREDIVPC and CBIVPC are used only in the property tax equation. As
the other dependent variables are not mechanically related to these aid
programs, the regular values of these three aid variables are used in the
other equations to allow for more precise estimates. Third, OMEQPC
is not present in the OTHREVPC and BORTRNPC equations and
COMBAS is not present in the TCEPC, TKEPC and OTHEXPC
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equations because there is no theoretical reason for these two variables
to influence the respective dependent variables.
Table 2 presents Model 3. The results for the aid variables find
that a dollar of federal aid funds both capital spending and other
spending. While none of the effects on the revenue side are significant
for this variable, borrowing and transfers is close and helps explain the
spending response. LGA funds current spending on approximately a
one-for-one basis and has no other significant effects. The homestead
credit is associated with a very large amount of both current and other
spending, as well as non··property tax revenues. There is no indication
of any property tax stimulation.
The results for the circuit breaker indicate a very large (1.394)
response in current spending as well as a positive response in borrowing
and transfers. It would seem unlikely that this much of the aid would be
shifted to the public sector. However, the high standard errors do
indicate that more plausible amounts are within the confidence intervals.
Each dollar of highway aid is associated with approximately equal
amounts of borrowing/transfers and capital spending. These results are
sensible, since much of this aid is designed to fund capital spending and
the issuance and redemption of debt for this function. Other state and
local aid funds current spending on a dollar-for-dollar basis, and also
stimulates other revenues. The tax price coefficient remains negative and
significant in the property tax equation and also has a negative influence
on current spending.
The tax capacity variable (OMEQPC) and per capita income give
the expected results, except for the negative influence of PCINC on
property tax revenues. 1he tax exporting variable (COMBAS) now has
an unexpected negative effect on property taxes and significant effects on
the other two revenue variables.
The demographic variables tell an interesting story. In the property
tax equation POWNOC continues to be negative and is significant as
expected. Elsewhere it is not significant. PYOUNG remains positive
and significant in the property tax equation and also has positive effects
on other revenues and capital spending. This is a reasonable result
because one would expect a variety of capital needs in cities with larger

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

EFFECT OF INTERGOVERNMENTAL AID

163

TABLE 2
Model 3: Pooled SUR Model, 1984-1986 (N=311)
Dependent
Variables

Parameter Estimates (Standard Error)
PTAXPC OTHREVPC BORTRNPC TCEPC

TKEPC

OTHEXPC

---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Intercept

76.56
(43.47)
OMEQPC
19.98*
(1.97)
FAIDPC
.034
(.049)
LGAPC/
.128
LGAIVPC
(.159)
CREDPC/
-.245
CREDIVPC
(.229)
CBNETPC/
.376
CBIVPC
(.196)
HYRPC
-.016
(.111)
.166
OTHRPC
(.137)
-81.50*
PRICE
(26.27)
PCINC
-3.80*
(thousands)
(1.53)
POWNOC
-.82*
(.41)
PYOUNG
1.46*
(.74)
1.00
POLD
(.54)
PPOOR
.93
(.85)
-.80*
COMB AS
(.29)

-167.76
(86.58)

162.98
(201)

.156
(.109)
-.201
(.224)
2.166*
(.441)
.435
(.459)
.416
(.246)
.635*
(.304)
-59.95
(45.59)
12.85*
(2.25)
-.64
(.85)
5.42*
(1.66)
-7.50*
(1.30)
2.64
(1. 90)
2.92*
(.54)

.485
(.270)
-.406
(.552)
.994
(1.074)
2.513*
(1.136)
1.235*
(.608)
.984
(.753)
4.42
(112.7)
13.29*
(5.51)
-3.03
(1.98)
3.43
(4.10)
-5.15
(3.22)
-0.76
(4.71)
-1.96*
(.63)

-33.72
(69.6)
15.60*
(2.92)
.164
(.095)
1.260*
(.188)
3.207*
(.370)
1.394*
(.400)
0.356
(.216)
1.017*
(.269)
-82.6*
(39.8)
4. 88
(2.49)
-1.31
(.69)
2. 80
(1.45)
-2.83*
(1.13)
3.22
(1.67)

54.57
(95.2)
-.51
(4.16)
.913*
(.130)
-.034
(.264)
.686
(.520)
-.475
(.551)
1.275*
(.295)
.657
(.367)
-70.4
(54.4)
7.47*
(3.46)
-1.75
(.938)
4.82*
(1.98)
-3.25*
(1.55)
0.31
(2.28)

90.45
(194.9)
8.25
(4.55)
.595*
(.267)
-.583
(.543)
2.100*
(1.058)
1.757
(1.124)
1.033
(.602)
.916
(.746)
45.4
(111.5)
7.54
(5.95)
-2.19
(1.92)
2.57
(4.06)
-6.38*
(3.19)
-1.08
(4.66)

System R-squared=.6403

* Indicates significant at the

.95 confidence level.
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proportions of children. POLD has a negative and significant effect on
all spending categories, as well as on other revenues, suggesting that the
elderly exert pressure to keep local spending down. Finally, PPOOR has
no significant effects.

DISCUSSION
This research corre,;:ted Bell and Bowman's study for simultaneity
and found that the homestead credit and LGA fund current spending but
do not directly stimulate additional property taxes. The negative effect
of the tax price variable on property taxes agrees with their results and
suggests that the homestead credit and the circuit breaker as designed
have an important indirect effect on local tax decisions by reducing the
local tax price residents perceive.
The circuit breaker program may have a positive effect on property
taxes and also funds public spending. This finding provides new
evidence relevant to the persistent question of the "flypaper effect." This
type of aid appears to more easily find its way into the public sector than
does private income. Although the money in this case does not "stick
where it hits," recipients and cities may be quicker to perceive it as
"public money" than other sources of private income.
Aggregate federal aid, state highway aid, and other state and local
aid have no significant effects on property taxes, but fund the type of
spending anticipated and do so in large proportions. In all these cases
a dollar of aid funds at least a dollar of spending.
Property tax capac:ity is a consistently important variable in
explaining property tax !~:vets. Per capita income does the same for nonproperty tax revenues and capital spending, although is curiously
negative for property taxes. The results on tax exporting are mixed.
The demographic variables generally behave as expected.

CONCLUSIONS
The influence of the tax price variable indicates the importance of
state aid design on local fiscal behavior. Other things equal, property
taxes are higher in those cities where state aid programs reduce the local
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marginal tax price. This suggests that programs such as the pre-reform
homestead credit and the circuit breaker that are meant to reduce
property taxes actually help stimulate these taxes. While certain types
of aid are designed to increase spending on certain functions, it is hard
to imagine that it would be desirable to create this incentive for the entire
local budget.
The Minnesota legislation that removed the tax price incentive effect
of the homestead credit should have beneficial effects. While it retains
the desired subsidy to homeowners, the program has been redesigned so
that it does not reduce local tax prices, and therefore should not stimulate
property taxes. However the circuit breaker effect on tax price is still
present, and if enough residents of a city receive large tax reductions
from this program, the incentive to increase property taxes would still
remain.
In contrast to the stimulative effect of the tax price on local levies,
aid programs with only income effects either had a zero or negative net
effect on city tax levies. This is further evidence that the design of aid
programs is important in the ultimate fiscal impact of the program.
Instead, these aid programs funded a dollar or more of spending for
every dollar of aid received. This finding differs from those of previous
studies that find both matching and lump sum aid programs to have small
spending effects and larger tax reduction effects (U.S. Department of the
Treasury, 1985; Ladd & Yinger, 1989; Fisher, 1996).
Methodologically, these results underscore Gramlich's caution of
more than twenty years ago that empirical work on the effects of grants
on budgets must be careful to control for simultaneity.
Financial aid to cities is a crucial part of our federal system. Aid
may take a variety of forms, and these findings indicate that differences
in program design affect local fiscal choice. Identifying the effects of aid
on local finances and behavior continues to be part of the research
agenda. Similar studies for other states could inform us about the effects
of different types of aid programs on local budgets. Policymakers may
then be able to craft aid policies to accomplish their desired objectives,
guided by the results of such research.
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NOTES
1. This derivation is contained in an appendix which is available upon
request from the author. It is drawn from Bartle ( 1990) and is based
on Inman (1979).
2. In model 1 the circuit breaker is not included and instead PRICE is
specified as: PRICE = 1 - (.54 * PHBMC).
3. The tax price variable constructed by Bell and Bowman (1987) was
weighted by the share of city housing that is owner occupied
(POWNOC). This does not seem warranted, especially where
POWNOC is a separate independent variable in the regression. The
price effect of the credit is related only to the credit percentage and
the share of homes below the credit maximum. Variation in the
portion of the tax base in rental housing may affect either the ability
to export taxes or the propensity for voters to favor tax increases,
but these effects should be accounted for separate! y, not in the
PRICE variable. In correspondence with Michael Bell, this point
was made. He responded in part, "we included POWNOC in our
definition of price to provide for a weighing for how important the
price variable is likely to be in the political decisionmaking process
in each local jurisdiction. Perhaps an alternative way of accounting
for this variation across municipalities ... would be to include a
separate independent variable in the regression measuring the percent
of homes that are owner occupied." This step is exactly what Bell
and Bowman did, and what was done here.
4. POLD, PYOUNG and POWNOC are all formed using decennial
Census data for 1980, 1990 and interpolating the values for 1984
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through 1988. For PPOOR, data for 1990 were not available at the
time this research commenced, so the values for all years were set
equal to the 1980 figure.
5. The tax exporting variable differs from that used by Bell and
Bowman. It does not break out commercial and industrial property
separate! y and instead is equal to the rental, commercial and
industrial share of total property value. In Bell and Bowman's study
it was defined as the apartment, commercial, industrial and
seasonal/recreational share of the tax base. The main difference here
is the addition of rented homes in COMBAS.
6. John Tomlinson, former Assistant Commissioner for Tax Policy of
the Minnesota Department of Revenue, wrote:
The Bell/Bowman study shows that there is a correlation between
city HC [homestead credit] per capita and city net levy per capita.
But the distribution formula for HC ... makes such a correlation
inevitable.... The situation [concerning LGA] is similar to the
homestead credit situation; the factors shown by Bell/Bowman to
be correlated (net city levy per capita and LGA per capita) are in
the basic LGA formula. Thus the two factors are bound to be
correlated. Bell & Bowman claim that correlation shows LGA per
capita causes levy per capita. I contend that it is the other way
around -- levy per capita causes LGA per capita, since that is the
way the LGA formula works.
7. Data to construct both tax price variables were available only for
1986 and 1988. For 1987 PRICE was an average of 1986 and 1988;
1984 and 1985 values were set equal to the 1986 figure.
8. Because only summary data on the circuit breaker were available for
1986, data for each <:ity were constructed from statewide data for
1986 and city data for 1985. From 1985 to 1986 the number of
filers statewide dropped by 2.3% and total payments increased by
2.36%. Thus each city's 1986 filer number was calculated as 97.7%
of that in 1985 and circuit breaker payments were 102.36% of the
city's total in 1985. Available data indicated that total payments
increased at almost the same rate from 1985 to 1986 between the
seven-county Minneapolis-St. Paul metropolitan area and the non-
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metropolitan area. If these are representative of the changes for each
city, then the estimates should be close to the actual.
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